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ABSTRACT 
The primary goal of this paper is to improve our understanding of the complex 
relationship between the positioning of companies in alliance networks and their 
innovative performance. In particular, we expect that a firm’s innovative performance 
depends partly on its position in specific network settings (block membership or non-
block membership), with additional effects caused by the technology positioning 
strategies firms pursue in terms of technological specialization in alliance blocks. 
Alliance groups derive their competitive advantage from their superior and particular 
technologies, which they develop and exploit together in the alliance blocks. 
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Incorporating this moderating effect of the degree of technological specialization in 
alliance blocks (exploitation or exploration) seems to give more insight in the contextual 
issues in this stream of literature. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The rapid increase in the number of newly established strategic alliances has led to the 
emergence of dense international strategic alliance networks (Chung et al.2000; 
Gomes-Casseres, 1996; Gulati, 1998). Over the past decades firms have gradually 
become more and more embedded in these dense inter-firm networks. Some of the 
most successful firms have recognized that particular network positions allow them to 
reap the full benefits from inter- firm alliances. In the academic literature several authors 
have begun to study the effectiveness of network positions by examining the effects of 
relational and structural embeddedness on company performance (see e.g., Hagedoorn 
and Duysters, 2002; Rowley et al., 2000).  In this paper we are interested in the effects 
of strong forms of embeddedness on innovative performance of firms. This is a debated 
issue, because in spite of a growing body of theoretical contributions, the empirical 
literature has been rather inconclusive about the performance effects of cohesive sub-
group membership, which is the strongest form of social embeddedness. Furthermore, 
we will aim to improve our current understanding of how contextual factors like a firm’s 
technology strategy, can moderate the effect of network positioning and innovative 
performance. 
 
Recent literature on strategic alliances has made significant progress in advancing our 
current understanding of inter-alliance dynamics, i.e. how social factors, social relations 
and competitive tension between alliances affects the intent of creating, building and 
sustaining collaborative advantage through alliance formation (e.g Gulati, 1995, 1998; 
Walker, Kogut and Shan, 1997, Chung, Singh and Lee, 2000). This so-called 
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endogenous dynamic refers to with whom specifically alliances are formed (Gulati et al, 
1999) as firms have several suitable partners at their disposal. In this context, alliance 
formation is based on building preferential relationships that are characterized by trust, 
stability and rich exchange of information between partners (Powell, 1990; Gulati, 
Gargiulo, 1999). Most of these theoretical contributions on network evolution assert that 
network formation proceeds through the formation of new relationships, building on the 
experience with existing ties. This stream of research thus focused on the role of the 
social structural context as an important driving factor in the alliance formation process 
(e.g. Gulati, 1995; Walker, Kogut and Shan, 1997; Chung, Singh, Lee, 2000). This 
social structural context refers to the fact that firms are embedded in a network of 
relations and have access to several qualified and resource complementary partners, 
which influences the decision with whom to tie up. 
Specifically, the social network perspective we adopt, addresses this social 
structural context driving the alliance formation process. It explains the collaborative 
behaviour of actors in terms of their position in networks of relationships (Gulati, 1998). 
The perspective posits that actors are embedded in a network of social relationships. 
Embeddedness refers to the structure of a network of social relations that can affect the 
firm’s economic action, outcomes and behaviour and that of its partners. Thus, 
embeddeness influences the firms’ tying behaviour, because it enables preferential 
relations to emerge from the direct and indirect contacts firms have built up in previous 
partnerships. By investing in those relations through the replication of their existing ties, 
firms build up social capital (Burt, 1992). Social capital captures the shared values, 
norms and trust between alliance partners and is thus by its very nature dependent on 
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history (Chung, Sing and Lee, 2000). Social capital drives the network to self-organize, 
self-transform and self-reinforce, as social capital forms the basis upon which the actors 
establish future social relations (Gulati, 1998). In this way, the network becomes a 
growing repository of information on the availability, reputation, competencies and 
reliability of prospective partners (Gulati, 1995; Powell et al., 1996). This process 
typically leads to the formation of densely connected blocks of collaborative 
relationships consisting of firms that are all mutually connected through multiple 
alliances. The emergence of such alliance blocki is generally considered as the 
emergence of one of the strongest forms of social embeddedness of companies. We 
define alliance blocks as cohesive subgroups in a social network which are 
characterized by a very dense networks of ties within the subgroup as compared to the 
relatively sparse networks of ties outside the subgroup” (Wasserman and Faust, 1994: 
267). Thus, the main characteristic of an alliance block or a cohesive subgroup in a 
social network is that the relationships among its members are more important and 
more numerous than the relationships between members and non-members 
(Fershtman, 1997). Alliance blocks, are generally characterized by a multitude of 
relatively strong ties (Nohria and Garcia-Pont, 1991; Vanhaverbeke and Noorderhaven, 
2001). Alliance block members seem to maintain and replicate strong and multiple ties 
within their group. The effect of block membership on the innovative performance of 
companies can therefore be seen in the light of the current debate on the advantages 
and disadvantages of social embeddedness. In this debate on the role of social 
embeddedness (e.g., Rowley et al., 2000; Gargiulo and Benassi, 2000) the basic 
arguments stem from Burt's (1992) structural hole argument versus Coleman's (1988) 
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closure argument. Burt (1992) suggests that firms embedded in sparsely connected 
networks will enjoy brokerage advantages based on access to non-redundant 
information (see also Rowley et al., 2000). Hence, strategic opportunities increase as 
firms form bridges between densely connected, i.e. redundant, parts of the network to 
other non-redundant, parts of the network (Burt, 1992; Walker et al., 1997). Such 
strategies enable these firms to access knowledge that is expected to have a higher 
yield than generated through redundant ties.  
Alternatively, Coleman (1988) argues that being part of a dense and apparently 
somewhat redundant network - like in an alliance block - is advantageous since it 
involves trust and cooperation among its members. As argued alliance blocks constitute 
the strongest form of embeddedness and are therefore a particular case-in-point. 
Increased cooperation in such alliance blocks consisting of trusting partners is then 
expected to generate high spill-over effects among network participants that also 
increase the performance of their joint activities. 
In examining the relation between network positions in dense or sparse networks 
and changing technological environments, some authors argue that strong and well-
embedded ties between partners are particularly effective under conditions of relative 
stability, whereas weak ties between somewhat distant companies are particularly 
geared towards dynamic industry environments (e.g., Rowley et al., 2000; Uzzi, 1997; 
Walker et al., 1997). Others (e.g., Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002) found that under 
conditions of technological and market turbulence a learning strategy employing many, 
seemingly redundant, alliances might be more effective to increase firm performance 
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than a strict maximizing strategy that is geared towards bridging structural holes by 
means of distant inter-firm ties.  
Despite several interesting theoretical contributions, the literature is still rather 
inconclusive about the performance effects of network positioning and more in particular 
on the effects of very strong forms of embeddedness such as block membership and 
technology strategies on company performance. Empirically, the effectiveness of an 
alliance block membership strategy in relation to innovative performance has remained 
largely unexplored. In order to contribute to the network theory on the relationship 
between embeddedness and innovative performance we choose to study one of the 
strongest form of embeddedness, alliance blocks, and their effect on innovative 
performance. We expect that the use of alliance blocks provides much more clear-cut 
results than the study of weaker forms of embeddedness. 
 
In this paper we will suggest a number of hypotheses, derived from our current 
understanding of some basic relationships between alliance block membership and 
innovative performance. Our main argument is that the effect of network positioning of 
companies on their innovative performance depends on both their position in one of two 
basic network settings (block membership or non-block membership) and on the 
technology strategy they follow that is either exploitation or exploration. Incorporating 
the moderating effect of the degree of technological specialization in alliance blocks 
seems to be a major step into discovering the contextual issues that prevents previous 
research from drawing clear-cut and generalizable conclusions. 
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1. HYPOTHESES 
Network Position and Innovative Performance  
Firms frequently select partners based on prior experience. Partnering is therefore often 
influenced by the network of prior ties (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999) and depends on the 
embedded social relations that a firm is already engaged in (Granovetter, 1985; Gulati, 
1998). This repeated tie effect can create strong cohesive ties through frequent 
interaction. These strong ties are solid and reciprocal relationships that create a basis of 
trust and intimacy between partners (Granovetter, 1973; Brass et al., 1998).  
When firms invest a substantial amount of time and energy in order to establish 
these strong relationships, changing partners in the short run is not very likely, as it 
involves substantial switching costs and it increases the risk that other existing 
relationships with its partners will also dissolve (Chung et al., 2000). As a consequence, 
firms prefer to engage in local search and replicate their existing ties rather than search 
for new ones (Gulati, 1995, 1998; Walker et al., 1997). In the context of innovative 
activities, firms use these local search strategies to initiate new joint R&D projects that 
share common technological characteristics with those of their prior partners (Stuart and 
Podolny, 1996). This local search process requires some pre-alliance technological 
overlap (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Mowery et al., 1996) or similarity in R&D activities 
(Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001) in order for firms to assimilate and understand the 
technology that firms can access through their ties (Duysters and Lemmens, 2003). 
Similarity thus encourages interaction, which can be seen as the main cause of 
attraction. This process is referred to as ‘interaction breeds similarity’ and ‘similarity 
breeds attraction’ (Brass et al., 1998). In this context of local search and similarity, firms 
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maintain and replicate strong and multiple ties, which lead to the formation of densely 
connected alliance groups. Thus, the more alliance block members will replicate their 
existing ties within their group, the higher the density of their in-group ties, which will 
result in a higher the level of embeddedness within the group (Gomes-Casseres, 1996; 
see Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982 for a more general social network perspective). 
Since trust is an important basis for knowledge sharing and joint learning (Brass 
et al., 1998; Nooteboom, 2002), firms use their strong and trustworthy relationships in 
the alliances within groups of collaborating companies (alliance blocks) to take 
advantage of knowledge spillovers to improve their innovative performance 
(Vanhaverbeke and Noorderhaven, 2001). Then, as these block members focus on 
technologies that are fairly similar, local search contributes to their incremental 
innovations, which further increases the block members’ competence in their 
technological domain and expertise (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001).  
On the other hand, firms that follow an individual innovation strategy outside of 
alliance blocks cannot take advantage of network externalities and knowledge spillovers 
that multiple, embedded ties provide for alliance block members. These non-block 
members lack this densely connected web of ties that constitutes a learning 
environment founded on trust-based governance, which is required for technological 
learning (Gomes-Casseres, 2001; Vanhaverbeke and Noorderhaven, 2001).  
 In other words, given the cohesion and familiarity of group-members based on 
their multiple, embedded ties in alliance blocks, companies with joint innovative 
activities that share knowledge within these alliance blocks are expected to generate 
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higher innovative performance than firms that follow an individual innovation strategy 
outside alliance blocks. Hence: 
H1: Members of alliance blocks have a higher innovative performance than non-alliance 
block firms. 
 
We expect that the benefits of alliance block membership are not distributed in a 
uniform way over time. Joining an alliance block provides the strongest benefits for the 
company immediately after it becomes a member of the block. The new environment 
and the abundance of new (indirect) ties increase the likelihood that the firm discovers 
and exploits new opportunities. Over time, the benefits of being a block member will 
level off  as over time as firms may start to suffer from relational ‘over-embeddedness’ 
(Uzzi, 1997), caused by relational inertia and the increasingly redundant similarity of 
firms within alliance blocks. Hence, we expect a negative relationship between the 
duration of a firm's membership in an alliance block and its innovative performance.  
The positive effect of an alliance block membership strategy based on the replication of 
preferential relations can also turn into a paralyzing effect as firms become locked-in in 
their own closed social system (Duysters and Lemmens, 2003). Relational inertia 
occurs when block members are constrained in their partner choice when linking up with 
firms of another alliance block or ‘outsiders’ in general (Gomes-Casseres, 1996). Over 
time, they may experience implicit social pressure from their partners to replicate their 
ties within the alliance block (Duysters and Lemmens, 2003) in order to prevent 
knowledge leakage outside of the alliance block. An implicit expectation of loyalty to 
other block members can prevent block members from allying with firms from competing 
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alliance blocks (Gulati et al., 2000) as this can result in conflicting interests among its 
partners (Nohria and Garcia-Pont, 1991). Hence, certain potential partners outside of an 
alliance block are not available when they have ties to ‘outside’ competitors of block 
members. In this way, competing alliance blocks can foreclose further partnering 
opportunities from non-block members (Gomes-Casseres, 1996). As a consequence, 
potential partners outside alliance blocks are simply excluded from partner selection 
and, based on their initial choices, firms can become locked-in their own alliance blocks. 
This phenomenon of strategic gridlock (Gomes-Casseres, 1996) forces blocks members 
to engage in local search for partners within their own alliance block, which can make 
them both relationally inert and over-embedded. 
The repeated tie effect in alliance blocks can also lead to an increasing similarity 
in technology profiles and can eventually result in technological over-embeddedness. In 
that context, the block members’ post-alliance technological profiles converge and they 
will increasingly become more similar. In the long run this will decrease potential 
learning effects among alliance partners (Mowery et al., 1996; Duysters and Lemmens, 
2003) as too much focus on developing competences through local search can lead 
firms to develop core rigidities (Leonard-Barton, 1995) and can cause firms to fall into 
competency traps (Levitt and March, 1988). This rigidity among block members will 
increase the likelihood that they become cognitively locked-in (Uzzi, 1997; Gargiulo and 
Benassi, 2000). The cognitive lock-in effects isolate block members from firms outside 
of the alliance block, as it filters the information and new perspectives that reach block 
members. In this state of rigidity, collective blindness, and technological over-
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embeddedness (Uzzi, 1997), alliance block members suffer from decreasing 
opportunities for learning and innovation (Duysters and Lemmens, 2003). 
As a consequence, firms in alliance blocks tend to gradually become more 
restrained in taking advantage of new technological opportunities and resource niches. 
Therefore, in terms of learning we expect that, over time, both relational and 
technological over-embeddedness lead to decreasing opportunities for learning and 
innovation. Therefore, we hypothesize: 
H2: There is a negative relationship between the duration of a company’s alliance block 
membership and its innovative performance. 
 
Technology strategies of alliance block members and innovative performance 
Alliance groups are basically technology-driven. Technology collaboration through direct 
ties in alliance blocks may have some advantages regarding their technology 
development. Firms in alliance blocks focus on similar, incremental innovations in their 
local search strategies. In this way, block members exploit their existing capabilities by 
linking up with firms in their own alliance block with similar technological profiles to 
improve their innovative performance. It provides access to complementary knowledge 
and skills to speed up the innovation process and enables firms to transfer knowledge 
and replenish their knowledge bases (Mowery et al. 1996; Kogut 1988). In this way, 
firms can internalize the competencies of partners to create next-generation 
competencies (Hamel 1991; Sakakabira 2002). The newly created knowledge becomes 
available to all firms involved. R&D investments made by partner block members have 
spillover effects in the sense that other block members receive more new knowledge in 
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return than in a stand-alone strategy outside of a block (Vanhaverbeke, Gilsing, 
Beerkens and Duysters, 200?).  
 
This benefit is especially relevant in case these firms follow a strategy of technological 
specialization. Technological specialization goes hand in hand with following an 
exploitation strategy instead of an exploration strategy. Exploitation focuses on existing 
core technologies and further improving and deepening them to attain competitive 
advantage; exploration on the opposite reflects the broadening of the knowledge base. 
Alliance groups derive their competitive advantage from their superior and particular 
technologies, which they develop and exploit together in the alliance blocks. This results 
in technological standard battles among alliance groups and independent firms (Gomes-
Casseres 1996; Das and Teng 2002). Since firms within those alliance blocks 
complement and build on each other’s specific technologies, we expect that these 
alliance block members can reach critical mass in terms of economies of scale and 
scope through their technological specialization in groups. Differences in performance 
among competing alliance groups can be due to the nature of the technological 
knowledge they possess and their ability to exploit that knowledge (Steensma and 
Corley 2000) over time.  
Therefore it seems that companies, which have a higher technological 
specialization, will be more innovative when they stay in a block for a longer time period, 
than firms that are less specialized. Then as long as the basis for partner attractiveness 
and ties within blocks does not change, the technological regime does not shift. This 
leads to a situation in which highly specialized alliance blocks thrive, whereas firms that 
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follow an exploration strategy and are positioned outside of a block are less effective. 
Non-block companies will have a hard time to individually coordinate and connect these 
incremental innovations (Chesbrough and Teece, 1996) as they follow individual 
innovation strategies outside of alliance blocks. 
These companies ‘waste’ a substantial amount of resources on individual projects under 
conditions where joint, incremental innovations are more effective.  
 
H3:  The longer the period of block membership in combination with a high degree of 
technological specialization of the block member, the higher the innovative performance 
of block-members compared to non-alliance block members  
 
DATA, VARIABLES AND METHOD 
Sample  
Our analysis refers to a group of major companies in the international microelectronics 
industry on which we have information regarding their partnering behavior during the 
period 1980-1997. The information on R&D and technology-driven alliances was 
obtained from the MERIT-CATI database (see Duysters and Hagedoorn (1993) for a 
description). The total number of strategic alliances in the sample is 2,864 concerning 
69 firms. Our data on R&D expenditures and revenues are available only from 1988 to 
1997 and hence this defines the period we analyze. Due to taking lags our estimation 
period is 1989 to 1997. 
We focus on the microelectronics sector and its network of strategic alliances for 
a number of reasons. The industry has been technology-driven throughout its history, 
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which indicates that technological positioning strategies and technology based 
competition are keys to survival (Podolny and Stuart, 1995). In the microelectronics 
industry, one finds a large number of strategic technology alliances that play an 
important role in the competitive strategies of companies (see amongst others, Duysters 
and Hagedoorn, 1998; Gomes-Casseres, 1996; Hagedoorn, 1993; Park et al., 2002).  
Furthermore, the microelectronics industry is a strategically important sector. It 
can be considered as the driving force of technological change in virtually all sectors of 
the information technology industry. It is of strategic importance, not only in terms of 
market size but also because its outputs are vital components in a wide range of other 
products. Finally, the industry has a high propensity to patent, especially in the period of 
our study. This allows us to track the innovative performance of the companies in our 
sample by means of their patenting activity.  
 
METHOD  
The dependent variable is a count variable and takes only nonnegative integer values - 
i.e. the number of patents a firm successfully filed for in a particular year. In our 
analyses we have used a conditional fixed effects negative binomial model. Though the 
fixed effects model is less efficient than the random effects model, the fixed effects 
model generates consistent estimates even when unobserved and observed firm-
variables are correlated. Another advantage of the negative binomial model is that it can 
account for count data that are overdispersed. ii For this reason, we prefer the negative 
binomial to a Poisson estimator. (Hausman, Hall, & Griliches, 1984).  
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Variables and measures 
The dependent variable innovative performance is measured by the number of US 
patents successfully applied for by firms in the period 1983-1997. Patents are allocated 
to the year the patent was applied for rather than the year it was granted to the firm, 
because the innovation has materialized when the company files for a patent rather 
than when it is granted. Despite some shortcomings, this indicator is generally 
considered as being the most appropriate measure of innovative performance at the 
company level (Acs and Audretsch, 1989; Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Hagedoorn and 
Duysters, 2002), especially in a single-industry high-tech sector study. Limiting the 
study to a single industrial sector minimizes problems related to other factors affecting 
patent propensity as these factors are likely to be stable within one industry (Griliches, 
1990; Ahuja and Katila, 2001).iii The microelectronics industry has shown a very high 
propensity to patent in the period of our study and therefore patents seem to be a valid 
way to measure innovative performance. 
Before we start the description of the explanatory variables we note that these 
are lagged one year in the empirical specifications. The independent variable alliance 
block membership indicates whether firms are part of a specific alliance block or not. 
Alliance blocks are densely connected subsets of actors in a network (Knoke and 
Kuklinski, 1982). We operationalize alliance block membership by investigating line 
connectivity within the group to line connectivity with firms outside the group. Line 
connectivity of a pair of alliance partners refers to the minimum number of lines to be 
removed to make sure no path exists anymore between them. Line connectivity thus 
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indicates the extent to which a pair of alliance partners remains connected by some 
path, even when alliances are deleted from the alliance network.  
We use ‘lambda sets’ to compare in-group ties to out-group ties; In other words, 
we compare the number of alliances with partners outside the group and the number of 
alliances within the group (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). In short, Lambda sets 
(Borgatti et al.,1990) represent a measure of cohesiveness in subgroups based on the 
number of alliances that should be removed in order disconnect two firms in the alliance 
network. It is therefore a measure of connectivity. A cohesive subset is likely to be 
difficult to disconnect when specific relationships are removed. Relatively strong blocks 
are characterized by a dense set of multiple connections by its partners. The removal of 
specific relationships in this case does not have a large impact on the overall 
connectiveness of partners in the block. Borgatti, Everett and Shirey (1990) define a 
Lambda set as “The set of nodes Ns, is a lambda set if any pair of nodes in the lambda 
set has larger line connectivity than any pair of nodes consisting of one node from within 
the lambda set and a second node from outside the lambda set” 
The higher the clustering level, the higher the line connectivity will be between all 
pairs of alliance partners (and therefore the higher the strength of ties within alliance 
blocks). This implies that the higher the line connectivity, the more the density of the ties 
with an alliance block increases. As a result, the hierarchical clustering level at which 
the lambda sets is constructed measures the level of embeddedness (to which we refer 
as "lambda level").  
To construct the 'block membership'-dummy variable, we chose a cut-off point in the 
lambda levels, which was available for all periods: the hierarchical clustering level 4. 
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Lambda sets were also defined at a clustering level of 2. Defined in this way, lambda 
sets are larger and less cohesive than lambda sets at clustering level 4. Hence we 
chose level 4 because we found that the group emerging at level 4 was more densely 
tied than the group at level 2iv. Firms that form lambda sets at that clustering level got a 
value of 1 for the block membership variable and 0 otherwise.  
In order to estimate the relation between innovativeness and the number of years 
a company is member of an alliance block, we created a variable measuring the 
duration of block membership. In this variable we count the years in which a company is 
unbrokenly present in an alliance block: years in block. In our dataset this implies that a 
company can be engaged in an alliance block for a maximum of 16 years as our data 
on alliance formation start early on. To avoid left-censoring problems, lambda sets were 
computed for the period prior to the observation period up to 1970. We start counting 
the years in block in 1981.  
The variable for technological specialization is derived by dividing the number of 
patents applied for in fifteen main semiconductor patent classes by the total amount of 
patents applied for per company per period. We expect that companies with a higher 
number of patent applications in microelectronics as compared to their overall patent 
applications (higher specialization in microelectronics), will be more innovative than 
firms that are less specialized in microelectronics.  
To test our hypotheses regarding the moderating role of technological 
specialization on the effect of duration of block membership and innovative 
performance, we introduce an interaction term. This allows us to measure the combined 
effect of the years a firm is pursuing an alliance block membership strategy and the 
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nature of its technology strategy it is pursuing. It measures whether the performance 
effect of block membership is contingent on the level of technological specialization. We 
expect that a higher level of technological specialization positively moderates the 
innovative effectiveness of a certain network positioning strategy in terms of block 
membership or non-block membership.  
 
We also introduced a number of control variables. First, we control for size of the firm in 
terms of the natural logarithm of annual revenues.v As we study technology 
partnerships, we also control for R&D intensity: the ratio of microelectronics-related 
R&D expenditures to revenues. We expect a positive effect of R&D intensity on patent 
activity, as these research efforts will (at least partly) be transformed into patents. This 
relationship, however, might not be linear as patenting rate may decrease gradually with 
an increase in R&D expenditure (Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002vi).  
Finally, we included two types of dummy variables. The first one indicates in 
which economic area the company is headquartered (Ohmae, 1985): a company can be 
headquartered in North America, Asia or Europe - the default is North-America. Firms 
from a different economic block may differ in their propensity to patent. Year dummy 
variables were included to capture changes over time in the propensity of companies to 
patent their innovations – 1989 is the default.  
 
RESULTS 
Table 1 describes the variables. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for all variables.  
 
22 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 3 represents the results for the random effects negative binomial model 
explaining the effect of different independent variables on the innovative performance 
(number of patents) of the companies. To avoid multicollinearity between block 
membership and years in block, we did not combine the variables in one regression 
(Table 3, model 1 and 2).  
 
The first hypothesis (H1) states that alliance block members are more innovative than 
non-block members. The estimate shows that block membership is indeed positively 
and significantly related to innovative performance. Companies in alliance blocks have 
on average 11% (= exp (0.1148, p < 0.1) more patents than firms that are not a member 
of alliance blocks (see table 3, model 1).  
To test hypothesis 2 we estimated the effect of the duration of block membership 
on innovative performance. The independent variable is the number of years a company 
is a block member, instead of block membership as such. According to hypothesis 2, we 
expect that there is a negative relation between years of block membership and 
innovative performance. Model 2 in Table 3 indicates that the impact on the 
innovativeness of the firm is negative and statistically significant (-0.0230, p < 0.05). 
Therefore, we cannot reject hypothesis 2.  
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[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
We also hypothesized that a high level of technological specialization in 
combination with a longer duration of block membership would be beneficial for the 
innovative performance of alliance block member (H3). The results for hypothesis 3 are 
shown in Model 2. In this model, the potential interaction between technological 
specialization and block based embeddedness is introduced as an interaction term.  
 
In model 2, the coefficient for specialization is negative and highly significant (-
0.5862, p<0.01). In contrast, the interaction with duration has a positive and significant 
effect (0.1364, p<0.01). This result indicates that long term membership of an alliance 
block pays off in case of pursuing a technology specialization, i.e. technology 
exploitation strategy.  
These results imply that we find support for hypothesis 3: long term membership 
of alliance blocks pays off when technological specialization is high. Figure 1 illustrates 
the combined effect of block membership duration (number of years a firm is member of 
a block) and its technological specialization. Point A represents a situation where non-
specialized (or technological diversified firms) have been member of a block for a long 
period; let us say 10 to 15 years. Firms with a highly diversified patent portfolio do not 
benefit from long term membership of a particular alliance block. Point B reflects a 
situation in which a firm is highly specialized in a particular type of technology but stays 
only a year or a few years in a block. This situation is, according to our results, also 
detrimental for the firm. In contrast, highly specialized firms that stay for a long time in a 
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particular alliance block seem to profit enormously of that membership (see point C in 
Figure 1). In sum, companies with a broad technology portfolio do not profit from block 
membership and the effect aggravates the longer a firm stays member of that block. 
Highly specialized firms should avoid short term stays in an alliance block but they can 
increase their innovative performance considerably when they stay for a long time in a 
block with the same partners.  
As far as the control variables are concerned, there are a few interesting results. 
The R&D intensity variable shows a negative sign in both models. We expected a 
positive sign as companies with higher investment intensity in R&D should be more 
innovative – all else equal. The negative effect find its roots in the inclusion of some 
start-ups that are outliers because  they invest heavily in R&D and do not have yet 
commercial products on the market.  
The sign of the coefficient of the 'size'-variable, expressed as the natural logarithm of 
annual revenues, is positive and significant as expected in both models. Since this 
variable is expressed as a natural logarithm its coefficient can be considered as 
elasticity. The fact that coefficient is much smaller than one indicates that smaller 
companies in microelectronics innovate proportionally more than their large 
counterparts. Finally, companies from Europe demonstrate significantly higher levels of 
innovative performance than their US-based and Asian competitors.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper aims to improve our understanding of the effect of alliance block 
membership on innovative performance. Since the academic literature has been rather 
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inconclusive about the performance effects of multiple collaborative agreements in 
general and of alliance block membership in particular, this study intends to contribute 
both in a theoretical as well as in an empirical way to the innovation performance effects 
of firms in alliance networks (e.g Rowley et al. 2000; Gargiulo et al.; 2000).Since 
alliance block membership can be seen as the strongest form of social embeddeness, 
the effect of block membership on the innovative performance of companies can 
therefore be considered in the light of the current debate on the advantages and 
disadvantages of social embeddedness (e.g. Burt, 1992; Coleman, 1988; Rowley et al, 
2000).  
 Furthermore, we were particularly interested in the moderating effect of the 
duration of block membership and the technology strategy they pursued in terms of 
either exploitation or exploration on innovative performance. Incorporating this 
moderating effect of the degree of technological specialization in alliance blocks 
(exploitation or exploration) provides a more detailed insight in the contextual issues in 
this literature stream on network positioning and innovative performance. 
If we first make abstraction from the possible moderating effect of technological 
specialization, our findings indicate that a block membership strategy does indeed 
positively influence the innovative performance of companies. Members of cohesive 
subgroups develop well embedded network ties, characterized by solid, reciprocal and 
trustworthy relationships (Granovetter, 1973).  
We expected a negative relationship between the number of years that a 
company is continuously present in an alliance block and its innovative performance; 
this hypothesis was confirmed. Firms in alliance blocks tend to gradually become more 
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restrained in taking advantage of new technological opportunities and resource niches 
due to being over-embedded in the network. 
However, this picture changes when we consider the role of technological 
specialization in the technology positioning strategies of companies. The latter positively 
affects the relation between the network position in alliance blocks and the innovative 
performance. The impact of the duration of block membership is contingent on the level 
of their technological specialization in the network. Our results indicate that long term 
membership of an alliance block pays off in case of pursuing a technology 
specialization, i.e. technology exploitation strategy. Long term membership of alliance 
blocks pays off when technological specialization is high, but becomes a liability when 
the level of technological specialization is low. This could be explained by the fact that 
firms in alliance blocks focus on similar, incremental innovations in their local search 
strategies. In this way, they exploit their existing capabilities by linking up with firms in 
their own alliance block with similar technological profiles to improve their innovative 
performance: they can speed up the innovation process and replenish their knowledge 
bases.  Since firms within those alliance blocks complement and build on each other’s 
specific technologies, we expect that these alliance block members can reach critical 
mass in terms of economies of scale and scope through their technological 
specialization in groups. Therefore it seems that companies, which have a higher level 
of technological specialization, will be more innovative when they stay in an alliance 
block for a longer time period, than firms that are less specialized. This leads to a 
situation in which highly specialized alliance blocks thrive, whereas firms that are not 
embedded in an alliance block are less innovative. Non-block companies will have a 
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hard time to individually coordinate and connect these incremental innovations and 
‘waste’ a substantial amount of resources on individual projects under conditions where 
joint, incremental innovations are more effective. 
To our knowledge, this paper is a first attempt to empirically link this intermediate 
level of alliance network characteristics (block membership vs. non-block membership) 
and to the innovative performance of companies. Hopefully, our paper stimulates further 
research that could incorporate more diverse network positioning strategies and 
contingency variables - than technological specialization alone- on innovative 
performance. We think of differentiating between several roles that non-block members 
can occupy in a network, like peripheral players or brokers that overarch occupying 
structural holes (Burt, 1992; Walker et al., 1997; Rowley et al., 2000, Baum et al., 2003). 
Companies occupying the latter role can access new information that opens up 
opportunities for them to explore alternative technological options and new 
technological environments (Hagedoorn and Duysters, 2002; Rowley et al., 2000). 
Brokers might be more innovative than peripheral players positioned in loosely coupled 
inter-firm networks. Also, including broker positions in future research could provide a 
more complete understanding of whether the virtues of block membership would weigh 
up against the possible innovative advantages of a broker position. 
This study is limited to only one industrial sector, which enables us to 
systematically explore the basic questions related to network strategy and innovative 
performance without the disturbances one could encounter in a multi-industry design.  
However, future research might provide further insight into this crucial 
relationship through more in-depth empirical research that covers other (high-tech) 
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industries and more contingencies. This paper can be seen as a starting point for future 
research aiming to improve our understanding of the complex relationship between the 
positioning of companies in alliance networks and their innovative performance. 
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• Table 1: Description of the variables 
 
Variable name Variable description  
 
Innovative performance Count of the number of US patents successfully filed for in year t.  Average over a three year period dependent 
variable 
  (period 1983-2000)    
Block membership A dummy variable indicating whether firm is member of a normalized lambda set with a cutoff-point  
  set at the hierarchical clustering level 4 
Duration (Years in block) Number of years a company is unbrokenly present in an alliance block 
Specialization The number of patents applied for in fifteen main semiconductor patent classes divided by the  
   total amount of patents applied for per company per three year period. 
Technological capital Count of the number patents that a firm filed for during the a period three years prior  
  to the year of observation  
Firm size (ln revenues) Natural logarithm of the total sales of the firm in t-1 (x 1000 Euro). Average over a three year period    
R&D-intensity Ratio of R&D expenditures over revenues. Average over a three year period. 
Year Dummy variable indicating a particular period (1989-1991 to 1995-1997) 
Europe Dummy variable set to one if the firm is headquartered in Europe 
Asia  Dummy variable set to one if the firm is headquartered in Asia 
Periods Dummy variables indicating three year periods from 1990-1992 to 1995-1997 
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• Table 2: Descriptive statistics and pair wise correlations 
 
 
 
 
  Mean s.d. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1. Innovative      
performan
ce 
164.79 340.583 0 3006 1                
2. Block 
membership 0.49 0.500 0 1 0.3894 1               
3. Years in 
block 1.04 2.610 0 15 0.4102 0.7186 1              
4. R&D 
intensity 0.15 0.563 0.0008 9.789 
-
0.1241 0.1348 0.2570 1             
5. 
Specialization 0.39 0.309 0 1 
-
0.2094 
-
0.0090 0.0746 0.2823 1            
6. Size (ln 
sales) 15.36 2.069 6.7475 18.937 0.6293 0.2831 0.2789 
-
0.3374 
-
0.4943 1           
7. Europe 0.26 0.439 0 1 -0.1193 
-
0.0187 0.0720 
-
0.0763 
-
0.1593 0.0703 1          
8. Asia 0.24 0.424 0 1 0.2582 -0.0653 
-
0.1867 
-
0.1710 
-
0.1766 0.3189 
-
0.1972 1         
9. Year 90 0.091 0.288 0 1 -0.0671 
-
0.0187 
-
0.0547 
-
0.0030 
-
0.0700 0.0449 
-
0.0078 0.0190 1        
10. Year 91 0.091 0.288 0 1 -0.0907 0.0162 
-
0.0563 0.0459 0.0074 
-
0.0180 0.0047 
-
0.0152 
-
0.1235 1       
11. Year 92 0.091 0.288 0 1 -0.0706 0.1296 0.0177 
-
0.0045 
-
0.0329 
-
0.0063 0.0158 
-
0.0022 
-
0.1184 
-
0.1323 1      
12. Year 93 0.091 0.288 0 1 -0.0904 0.0606 
-
0.0022 0.0387 0.0132 
-
0.0524 0.0206 
-
0.0074 
-
0.1333 
-
0.1489 
-
0.1428 1     
13. Year 94 0.091 0.288 0 1 -0.0043 0.0131 0.0323 
-
0.0249 
-
0.0342 
-
0.0047 
-
0.0431 
-
0.0274 
-
0.1285 
-
0.1435 
-
0.1376 
-
0.1549 1    
14. Year 95 0.091 0.288 0 1 0.0536 -0.0387 0.0521 
-
0.0211 
-
0.0181 
-
0.0005 
-
0.0058 
-
0.0274 
-
0.1285 
-
0.1435 
-
0.1376 
-
0.1549 
-
0.1493 1   
15. Year 96 0.091 0.288 0 1 0.1076 -0.1041 0.0452 
-
0.0111 0.0867 0.0049 0.0101 
-
0.0088 
-
0.1210 
-
0.1351 
-
0.1296 
-
0.1459 
-
0.1405 
-
0.1405 1  
16. Year 97 0.091 0.288 0 1 0.1817 -0.0638 
-
0.0039 0.0040 0.0929 0.0113 0.0047 
-
0.0152 
-
0.1235 
-
0.1379 
-
0.1323 
-
0.1489 
-
0.1435 
-
0.1435 
-
0.1351 1 
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• Table 3  Random effects estimates explaining the innovative performance of firms 
•  
Variable H1(model 1) 
H2&H3 
(model 2) 
Block membership 0.1148* (0.0716)  
Years in block  -0.0230** (0.0095) 
(Specialization)*(Duration)  0.1364*** (0.0357) 
Specialization -0.5848* (0.3231) 
-0.5862*** 
(0.2257) 
   
R&D intensity -0.3488 (0.4557) 
-03612 
(0.4627) 
Size (logarithm of 
revenues)  
0.2865*** 
(0.0646) 
0.4039*** 
(0.0477) 
Europevii  2.6886** (1.109) 
4.1408*** 
(1.4746) 
Asia 0.4551 (0.3019) 
0.4022* 
(0.2493) 
Year 90 0.0687 (0.1422) 
0.0188 
(0.1094) 
Year 91 -0.0007 (0.1468) 
-0.1095 
(0.1128) 
Year 92 -0.0097 (0.1513) 
-0.1521 
(0.1130) 
Year 93 0.0014 (0.1531) 
-0.1306 
(0.1129) 
Year 94 0.0014 (0.1544) 
0.0242 
(0.1122) 
Year 95 0.2795* (0.1531) 
0.0716 
(0.1123) 
Year 96 0.4201*** (0.1541) 
0.1682 
(0.1146) 
Year 97 0.4989*** (0.1576) 
0.2405** 
(0.1151) 
Constant -2.492** (1.0606) 
-4.2879*** 
(0.7642) 
Wald chi sq.  350.46*** 510.01*** 
Number of observations 229 330 
Number of firms 39 47 
 
 
 
• Notes: 
• *Significant at the 10 % level, **Significant at the 5 % level, ***Significant at the 1 % level; 
• Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
+ Likelihood-ratio test of alpha=0 
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Figure 1:  The combined effect of technological specialization and number of 
years in an alliance block  
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• ENDNOTES 
 
 
 
                                                
i
  Nohria and Garcia-Pont (1991, p. 106) define a strategic block as "...a set of firms that are 
connected more densely to each other than to other firms in the industry".  The existence 
of strategic blocks of firms was already anticipated by Harrigan (1985) who described 
them as constellations of firms. Empirical analysis of strategic blocks in different 
industries can be found in Nohria and Garcia-Pont (1991), Gomes-Casseres (1996) and 
Vanhaverbeke and Noorderhaven (2001).  
 The concept of alliance blocks is also related to the small worlds concept indicating that 
the inter-organizational network is characterized by clique-like groups of firms. The 
density within the groups is high and low between the groups (Baum et al, 2003; Schilling 
and Phelps, 2004; Watts, 1999).    
ii
  In the Negative Binomial model, the variance of the dependent variable is larger than the 
mean, in contrast to the Poisson model, where the variance equals the mean. 
 
iii
  Also, as indicated by Hagedoorn and Cloodt (2003), in high-tech sectors, such as 
microelectronics, patent counts are equally well-suited for the measurement of innovative 
performance as other indicators such as patent citations and new product 
announcements. 
iv
  We also used a cut-off point of 2 to test for the robustness of the empirical results. The 
results were found to be very similar to the ones using cut-off point 4. 
v
  We have chosen revenues as an indicator for firm size instead of the more frequently 
applied employment indicator to account for the effects of quasi-integration. Japanese 
companies often have fewer employees than their US and European competitors on 
account of the Japanese lean production methods and sophisticated customer supplier 
networks (Duysters and Hagedoorn, 1995).  
vi
  'R&D-expenditures' would be an interesting control variable but it correlated in a very 
strong way (0.90) with annual sales. To avoid multicollinearity problems we chose to 
introduce R&D-intensity as a control variable.  
vii
  USA is the default. 
